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Abstract
Recent work has exposed the vulnerability of computer vision models to spatial transformations. Due
to the widespread usage of such models in safety-critical applications, it is crucial to quantify their ro-
bustness against spatial transformations. However, existing work only provides empirical quantification
of spatial robustness via adversarial attacks, which lack provable guarantees. In this work, we propose
novel convex relaxations, which enable us, for the first time, to provide a certificate of robustness against
spatial transformations. Our convex relaxations are model-agnostic and can be leveraged by a wide range
of neural network verifiers. Experiments on several network architectures and different datasets demon-
strate the effectiveness and scalability of our method.
1 Introduction
It was recently shown that neural networks are susceptible not only to standard noise-based adversarial
perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini, Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018),
but also to spatially transformed images that are visually indistinguishable from the original (Kanbak et al.,
2017; Alaifari et al., 2019; Xiao et al., 2018; Engstrom et al., 2019). Such spatial attacks can be modeled
by smooth vector fields that describe the displacement of every pixel. Common geometric transformations,
e.g., rotation and translation, are particular instances of these smooth vector fields, which indicates that
they capture a wide range of naturally occurring image transformations.
Since the vulnerability of neural networks to spatially transformed adversarial examples can pose a
security threat to computer vision systems relying on such models, it is critical to quantify their robust-
ness against spatial transformations. A common approach to estimate neural network robustness is to
measure the success rate of strong attacks (Carlini, Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018). However, many
networks which are indeed robust against these attacks were later broken using even more sophisticated
attacks (Athalye, Carlini, 2018; Athalye et al., 2018; Engstrom et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2020). The key
issue is that such attacks do not provide provable robustness guarantees.
(a) Original (b) δ = 1, γ = ∞ (c) δ = 3, γ = 0.25
Figure 1: Image instances and corresponding deforming vector fields (γ and δ explained below): (a) origi-
nal, (b) adversarially deformed (label 5) by non-smooth vector field, and (c) adversarially deformed (label
3) by smooth vector field.
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To address this, our goal is to provide a provable certificate that a neural network is robust against all
possible deforming vector fields within an attack budget for a given dataset of images. While various cer-
tification methods exist, they are limited to noise-based perturbations (Katz et al., 2017; Gehr et al., 2018;
Wong, Kolter, 2018; Singh et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018) or compositions of common geometric trans-
formations (e.g., rotations and translations) (Pei et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2019b; Balunovic et al., 2019;
Mohapatra et al., 2020) and thus cannot be applied to our setting.
A common approach in robustness certification is to compute, for a given image, pixel bounds that con-
tain all possible perturbed images within some attack budget, and to then propagate these bounds through
the network to obtain bounds on the output neurons. Then, if all images within the output bounds classify
to the correct label, the network is provably robust against all attacks limited to the same attack budget. In
our work, we intuitively parametrize the attack budget by the magnitude of pixel displacement, denoted by
δ, and the smoothness of the vector field, denoted by γ. This allows us to efficiently compute the tightest-
possible pixel interval bounds on vector field deformations limited to a given displacement magnitude δ
by using a mathematical analysis of the transformation. However, even small but non-smooth vector fields
(i.e., small δ but large γ) can generate large pixel differences resulting in recognizably perturbed images
(Figure 1b) and leading to large pixel bounds, which limit certification performance. Thus, a key challenge
is to define smoothness constraints that can be efficiently incorporated with neural network verifiers to
enable certification of smooth vector fields with large displacement magnitude (Figure 1c).
Hence, we tighten our convex relaxation for smooth vector fields by introducing smoothness constraints
that can be efficiently incorporated into state-of-the-art verifiers (Tjeng et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2019a,c).
To that end, we leverage the idea of computing linear constraints on the pixel values in terms of the transfor-
mation parameters (Balunovic et al., 2019; Mohapatra et al., 2020). We show that our mathematical anal-
ysis of the transformation induces an optimization problem for computing the linear constraints, which
can be efficiently solved by linear programming. Finally, we show that the idea by Balunovic et al. (2019);
Mohapatra et al. (2020) alone is insufficient for the setting of smooth vector fields and only the combina-
tion with our smoothness constraints yields superior certification performance. We implement our method
in an open-source system and show that our convex relaxations can be leveraged to, for the first time, certify
neural network robustness against vector field attacks.
Key contributions We make the following contributions:
• A novel method to compute the tight interval bounds for norm-constrained vector field attacks, en-
abling the first certification of neural networks against vector field attacks.
• A tightening of our relaxation for smooth vector fields and integrationwith state-of-the-art robustness
certifiers.
• An open-source implementation together with extensive experimental evaluation on the MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets, with convolutional and large residual networks.We make our code publicly avail-
able as part of the ERAN framework for neural network verification (https://github.com/eth-sri/eran).
2 Related Work
Here we discuss the most relevant related work on spatial robustness and certification of neural networks.
Empirical spatial robustness In addition to previously known adversarial examples based on ℓp-norm
perturbations, it has recently been demonstrated that adversarial examples can also be constructed via ge-
ometric transformations (Kanbak et al., 2017), rotations and translations (Engstrom et al., 2019), Wasser-
stein distance (Wong et al., 2019; Levine, Feizi, 2019; Hu et al., 2020), or via smooth vector field defor-
mations (Alaifari et al., 2019; Xiao et al., 2018). Here, we use a threat model based on vector field de-
formations for which both prior works have proposed attacks: Alaifari et al. (2019) perform first-order
approximations to find minimum-norm adversarial vector fields, and Xiao et al. (2018) relax vector field
smoothness constraints with a continuous loss to find perceptually realistic adversarial examples.
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Robustness certification There is a long line of work on certifying the robustness of neural networks
to noise-based perturbations. These approaches employ SMT solvers (Katz et al., 2017), mixed-integer lin-
ear programming (Tjeng et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2019c), semidefinite programming (Raghunathan et al.,
2018), or linear relaxation methods (Gehr et al., 2018; Wong, Kolter, 2018; Singh et al., 2018; Zhang et al.,
2018; Singh et al., 2019b; Wang et al., 2018a; Weng et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2018b; Salman et al., 2019b;
Lin et al., 2019). Another line of work considers randomized smoothing (Lecuyer et al., 2018; Cohen et al.,
2019; Salman et al., 2019a) which provides probabilistic robustness guarantees.
Certified spatial robustness Prior work introduced certification methods for some special cases of spa-
tial transformations: a finite number of transformations (Pei et al., 2017), rotations (Singh et al., 2019b) and
compositions of common geometric transformations (Balunovic et al., 2019; Mohapatra et al., 2020). Some
randomized smoothing approaches exist, but they only handle single parameter transformations (Li et al.,
2020) or transformations without compositions (Fischer et al., 2020). In another setting, Wu, Kwiatkowska
(2020) compute the maximum safe radius on optical flow video perturbations but only for a finite set of
neighboring grid points. Overall, previous approaches are limited by the fact that they only certify transfor-
mations in specific templates which can be characterized as special cases of smooth vector fields deforma-
tions. Certifying these vector field deformations is precisely the goal of our work.
3 Background
Here we introduce our notation, define the similarity metric for spatially transformed images, and provide
the necessary background for certification of neural networks.
Spatial transformations We represent an image as a function I : P ⊆ R2 → RC , where C denotes
the number of color channels, and P = {1, 2, . . . ,W}2 corresponds to the set of pixel coordinates of the
image of dimensionW ×W .
Spatial transformations are parameterized by a vector field τ : P → R2 assigning a displacement
vector to every pixel. For an image I , we define the transformed image I + τ : P → R2, mapping the pixel
coordinates (i, j) to (I + τ)(i, j) = (i, j) + τ(i, j). Since these deformed coordinates may not lie on the
integer grid, we use bilinear interpolation II : R2 → RC evaluated at (i, j) + τ(i, j) to get the new pixel
values:
II (i, j) :=
{
ImnI (i, j) if (i, j) ∈ Amn ,
ImnI (i, j) :=
∑
p∈{m,m+1}
q∈{n,n+1}
I(p, q) (1− |p− i|) (1− |q − j|) , (1)
whereAmn := [m,m+ 1]× [n, n+ 1] is an interpolation region. Like Alaifari et al. (2019), we only study
vector fields that do not move pixels outside the image.
Estimating perceptual similarity For noise-based adversarial attacks, an adversarial image Iadv is typ-
ically considered to be perceptually similar to the original image I if the ℓp-norm of the perturbation
‖I − Iadv‖p is small (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini, Wagner, 2017; Madry et al.,
2018). However, prior work (Alaifari et al., 2019; Xiao et al., 2018) has demonstrated that this is not nec-
essarily a good measure for spatially transformed images. For example, translating an image by a small
amount will typically produce an image that looks very similar to the original, but results in a large per-
turbation with respect to the ℓp-norm. For this reason, the similarity of spatially transformed images is
typically estimated with a norm on the deforming vector field and not on the pixel value perturbation. Here,
we consider the Tp-norm (Alaifari et al., 2019), defined as
‖τ‖Tp := max(i,j)∈P
‖τ (i, j)‖p .
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Figure 2: Convex relaxation of a sample neural network with inputs x0 and x1, and vector field components
vx, vy , wx, and wy .
We consider p ∈ {1, 2,∞} and note that the case p = 2 corresponds to the norm used by Alaifari et al.
(2019). Intuitively, a vector field with T2-norm at most 1 will displace any pixel by at most one grid length
on the image grid. In general, for a vector field τ with ‖τ‖Tp ≤ δ, the set of reachable coordinates from a
single pixel (i, j) ∈ P is
Bpδ (i, j) :=
{
x ∈ R2 | ‖(i, j)− x‖p ≤ δ
}
.
However, there may be vector fields with small Tp-norm that produce unrealistic images. For example,
moving every pixel independently by at most 1 grid length can already result in images that are very
pixelated and that can be easily recognized as unnatural when comparing with the original (Figure 1b). To
address this, Xiao et al. (2018) introduced a flow loss that penalizes the lack of smoothness of a vector
field. Following this approach, we say that vector field τ has flow γ if it satisfies, for each pixel (i, j), the
flow-constraints
||τ(i, j)− τ(i′, j′)||∞ ≤ γ, ∀(i
′, j′) ∈ N (i, j), (2)
where N (i, j) ⊆ P represents the set of neighboring pixels in the 4 cardinal directions of pixel (i, j). For
instance, translation is parametrized by a vector field that has flow 0 (each pixel has the same displacement
vector). These constraints enforce smoothness of the vector field τ , which in turn ensures that transformed
images look realistic and better preserve image semantics – even for large values of δ (Figure 1c). We
provide a more thorough visual investigation of the norms and constraints considered in Appendix D.
Robustness certification Robustness of neural networks is typically certified by (i) computing a convex
shape around the input we want to certify (an over-approximation) and (ii) propagating this shape through
all operations in the network to obtain a final output shape. Robustness is then proven if all concrete outputs
inside the output shape classify to the correct class. For smaller networks, an input shape can be propagated
exactly using mixed-integer linear programming (Tjeng et al., 2017). To scale to larger networks, standard
approaches over-approximate the shape using various convex relaxations: intervals (Gowal et al., 2019),
zonotopes (Gehr et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018), and restricted polyhedra (Zhang et al.,
2018; Singh et al., 2019b), just to name a few. In this work, we build on the convex relaxation DeepPoly, an
instance of restricted polyhedra, introduced in (Singh et al., 2019b), as it provides state-of-the-art precision
while scaling to larger networks. For every pixel, DeepPoly receives a lower and upper bound on the pixel
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Figure 3: Image with bilinear interpolation and dots showing pixel positions. Interval bound candidates
(i.e., potential extrema of bilinear interpolation, see Section 5) shown as dots in Figures 3b and 3c are
bounded by linear planes to enforce flow-constraints.
value, i.e., an input shape in the form of a box. This shape is then propagated by maintaining one lower and
upper linear constraint for each neuron. Here, we first show how to construct a tight box around all spatially
transformed images. However, since this box does not capture the relationship between neighboring pixels
induced by flow-constraints, it contains spurious images that cannot be produced by smooth vector fields.
To address this, we tighten the convex relaxation for smooth vector fields by incorporating flow-constraints.
4 Overview
We now provide an end-to-end example of how to compute our convex relaxation of spatial transformations
and use it to certify the robustness of the toy network in Figure 2. This network propagates inputs x0 and
x1 according to the weights annotated on the edges. Neurons x2 (x3) and x4 (x5) denote the pre- and
post-activation values, and x6 and x7 are the network logits. We augment this network by vector field
components vx, vy , wx, and wy , to introduce the flow-constraints.
The concrete inputs to the neural network are the pixels marked with blue (x0) and green (x1), shown
in Figure 3a. The image is perturbed by a vector field of T∞-norm δ = 0.5 and flow γ = 0.25, thus the blue
and green pixels are allowed to move in the respective rectangles shown in Figure 3a. However, in order to
satisfy the flow-constraints, their deformation vectors can differ by at most γ = 0.25 in each coordinate.
Our objective is to certify that the neural network classifies the input to the correct label regardless
of its deformed pixel positions. A simple forward pass of the pixel values x0 = 0 and x1 = 0.5 yields
logit values x6 = 0 and x7 = 0.625. Assuming that the image is correctly classified, we thus need to
prove that the value of neuron x7 is greater than the value of neuron x6 for all admissible smooth vector
field transformations. To that end, we will first compute interval bounds for the pixels, without using the
relationship between vector field components vx, vy , wx, and wy , and then, in a second step, we tighten the
relaxation for smooth vector fields by introducing linear constraints on x0 and x1 in terms of vx, vy ,wx, and
wy to exploit the flow-constraint relationship. Propagation of our convex relaxation through the network
closely follows Singh et al. (2019b), and we provide a full formalization of our methods in Section 5.
Calculating interval bounds The first part of our convex relaxation is computing upper and lower in-
terval bounds for the values that the blue and green pixel can attain on their ℓ∞-neighborhood of radius
δ = 0.5. For both pixels, the minimum and maximum are attained on the left and right border of the
ℓ∞-ball respectively. Using bilinear interpolation from Equation (1), we thus obtain the interval bounds
[l0, u0] = [0, 0.25] for x0 and [l1, u1] = [0.25, 0.75] for x1.
Interval bound propagation The intervals [l0, u0] and [l1, u1] can be utilized directly for verification
using standard interval propagation to estimate the output of the network (Gehr et al., 2018; Gowal et al.,
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2019; Mirman et al., 2018). While this method is fast, it is also imprecise. The interval bounds for x2 and
x4 are
[l2, u2] = 2 · [l0, u0]− [l1, u1] + 0.25
= [2l0 − u1 + 0.25, 2u0 − l1 + 0.25] = [−0.5, 0.5],
[l4, u4] = [max(l2, 0),max(u2, 0)] = [0, 0.5].
All lower and upper interval bounds are given in Figure 2. The output for x6 is thus between l6 = −1 and
u6 = 0, while the one for x7 is between l7 = −0.375 and u7 = 0.875. As this is insufficient to prove
x7 > x6, certification fails.
Backsubstitution To gain precision one can keep track of the relationship between the neurons by storing
linear constraints (Zhang et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2019b). In addition to [l2, u2] we store upper and lower
bounding linear constraints
2x0 − x1 + 0.25 ≤ x2 ≤ 2x0 − x1 + 0.25.
Similarly, for x4 we store, in addition to [l4, u4],
0 ≤ x4 ≤ 0.5x2 + 0.25,
where we used the rules given in Singh et al. (2019b) to calculate the upper and lower linear constraints.
All linear constraints are shown in Figure 2, next to the corresponding neurons. Certification succeeds, if
we can show that x7 − x6 > 0. Using the linear constraints, we thus obtain
x7 − x6 ≥ (−x4 + x5)− (−2x4) = x4 + x5
≥ x3 ≥ x1 − x0 + 0.125 ≥ 0.125.
This proves that x7 − x6 > 0, implying that the network classifies to the correct class under all considered
deformations.
Spatial constraints Although the above method can certify robustness, certification fails for a more
challenging network where the bias of x3 is equal to −0.125 instead of 0.125. With the previous approach
we can only prove x7 − x6 ≥ x1 − x0 − 0.125 ≥ −0.125, which is insufficient for certification. However,
we can leverage our vector field smoothness condition (Equation (2)), namely that deformation vectors
of x0 and x1 can differ by at most γ = 0.25 in the ℓ∞-norm. Unfortunately, these constraints cannot be
directly applied since they are defined on the vector field components and not on the pixel values. To amend
this, we build on the idea from Balunovic et al. (2019); Mohapatra et al. (2020) and add upper and lower
bounding linear constraints on the pixel values x0 and x1. That is, we compute upper and lower planes in
terms of vector field components vx and vy for x0 and wx and wy for x1 as shown in Figures 3b and 3c.
The plane equations are shown in Figure 2 and details on the computation are provided in Section 5. By
substituting these plane equations into our expression and considering that all vector field components vx,
vy , wx, and wy are bounded from above and below by [−δ, δ] = [−0.5, 0.5], we thus obtain
x7 − x6 ≥ x1 − x0 − 0.125
≥ (0.5 + 0.5wx)− (0.125 + 0.25vx)− 0.125
= 0.25 + 0.5wx − 0.25vx ≥ −0.125,
showing that a simple instantiation of the idea by Balunovic et al. (2019); Mohapatra et al. (2020) is insuf-
ficient for certification in our setting. Only with our flow-constraints −γ ≤ vx − wx ≤ γ with γ = 0.25
can we finally certify:
x7 − x6 ≥ x1 − x0 − 0.125
≥ 0.25 + 0.5wx − 0.25vx
= 0.25 + 0.25wx + 0.25(wx − vx) ≥ 0.0625.
In practice, the resulting expression may have more than two pixels, and we use a linear program (described
in Section 5) to perform the substitution of flow-constraints.
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5 Convex Relaxation
Here, we introduce a novel convex relaxation tailored to spatial transformations. First, we compute the
tightest interval bounds for each pixel in the transformed image. As intervals do not capture dependencies
between variables, we then propose a method for introducing linear constraints on the pixel values in terms
of vector field components and show how to use flow-constraints to further tighten our convex relaxation.
5.1 Computing Tight Interval Constraints
Consider an image I and a maximum pixel displacement δ. Our goal is to compute, for pixel (i, j), interval
bounds li,j and ui,j such that li,j ≤ II ◦ (I + τ)(i, j) ≤ ui,j , for any vector field τ of Tp-norm of at most
δ. We now show how to compute tight interval pixel bounds [li,j , ui,j ].
Within a given interpolation regionAmn, the pixel (i, j) can move to positions inB
p
δ (i, j)∩Amn. Thus,
for every pixel, we construct a set of candidates containing the possible maxima and minima of that pixel in
Bpδ (i, j)∩Amn. However, this could potentially yield an infinite set of candidate points, and we thus make
the key observation that the minimum and maximum pixel values of ImnI in B
p
δ (i, j) ∩ Amn are always
obtained at the boundary (see Lemma 5.1 below, with proof provided in Appendix A). Hence, for any
reachable interpolation region Amn it suffices to consider the boundary of B
p
δ (i, j) ∩ Amn to analytically
derive the candidate points. Finally, we set the lower and upper bound of the pixel value to the minimum
and maximum of the candidate set, respectively.
Lemma 5.1. The minimum and maximum pixel values of ImnI in B
p
δ (i, j) ∩ Amn are always obtained at
the boundary.
We note that it is important to calculate the candidates analytically in order to guarantee soundness of
the interval bounds. Furthermore, for a single-channel image, our interval bounds are exact, i.e., for every
deformed image within our pixel bounds there exists a corresponding vector field τ with ||τ ||p ≤ δ. For the
derivation of candidates we make use of the following auxiliary lemma (with proof in Appendix A):
Lemma 5.2. The bilinear interpolation ImnI (v, w) on the regionAmn can be rewritten as
ImnI (v, w) = A+Bv + Cw +Dvw. (3)
Candidates for T∞ The boundary ofB
∞
δ (i, j)∩Amn consists of line segments parallel to the coordinate
axes. This means that for all pixels (v, w) on such a line segment either v or w is constant. Thus, according
to Lemma 5.2, if v is fixed, then ImnI is linear in w and vice-versa. Hence, we only need to consider the
line segment endpoints to obtain the candidate set of all possible extremal values in B∞δ (i, j) ∩Amn.
Candidates for T1 The boundary of B
1
δ (i, j) ∩ Amn consists of line segments parallel to the coordinate
axes, or lines defined byw = ±v+a. In the first case, we add the pixel values of the line segment endpoints
to the set of candidates. In the second case, the bilinear interpolation ImnI restricted to w = ±v + a is a
polynomial of degree two given by
ImnI (v,±v + a) = A+Bv + C(±v + a) +Dv(±v + a)
= (A+ Ca) + (B ± C)v ±Dv2.
Thus, the extremum can be attained on the interior of that line, unlike the T∞-case. Hence, we add both
the endpoint values and the extremum of the polynomial to the candidate set if the corresponding extremal
point lies on the line segment.
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Candidates for T2 The boundary of B
2
δ (i, j) ∩ Amn consists of line segments parallel to the coordinate
axes or an arc with circle center (i, j). We handle the line segments by adding the pixel values at the
endpoints to the candidate set. However, the interpolation can also have minima and maxima on the interior
of the arc. To find those, we extend the interpolation ImnI from Amn to R
2 and use Lagrange multipliers
to find the extrema on the circle v2 + w2 = δ2 (assuming i = j = 0 for notational convenience). The
Lagrangian is
Λ(v, w, λ) := ImnI (v, w) − λ(v
2 + w2 − δ2),
which yields
∇v,w,λΛ(v, w, λ) =

B +Dw − 2λvC +Dv − 2λw
δ2 − v2 − w2

 != 0.
Solving the first two equations for λ we obtain
λ =
B +Dw
2v
and λ =
C +Dv
2w
,
assuming v 6= 0 6= w (else δ = 0). Eliminating λ, we have
w(B +Dw)− v(C +Dv) = 0.
We solve this quadratic equation and substitute the solutions
w =
−B ±
√
B2 + 4Dv(C +Dv)
2D
.
into δ2 − v2 − w2 = 0 to obtain
δ2 = v2 +
(
−B ±
√
B2 + 4Dv(C +Dv)
2D
)2
.
Setting E := −B2D , F :=
B2
4D2 , andG :=
C
D
we have
δ2 = v2 +
(
E ±
√
F +Gv + v2
)2
= v2 + E2 ± 2E
√
F +Gv + v2 + F +Gv + v2
= 2v2 +Gv ± 2E
√
F +Gv + v2 +H,
forH := (E2 + F ). Solving for v requires squaring both sides to resolve the square root, thus yielding
(
δ2 −H −Gv − 2v2
)2
=
(
±2E
√
F +Gv + v2
)2
= 4E2(F +Gv + v2).
We are thus interested in finding the roots of
J +Kv + Lv2 +Mv3 +Nv4 (4)
with
J :=
(
δ2 −H
)2
− 4FE2,
K := −2G
((
δ2 −H
)
+ 2E2
)
,
L := G2 − 4
((
δ2 −H
)
+ E2
)
M := 4G
N := 4,
8
which is a polynomial of degree four. The roots of a polynomial of degree four are known in closed-
form (Shmakov, 2011) and we use Durand-Kerner’s root finding method (Kerner, 1966) to compute them
analytically. We recall that computing the roots approximately, e.g., via gradient descent or Newton’s
method, does not guarantee soundness of the interval bounds. If the coordinates obtained from the roots
of Equation (4) lie within Amn, we add the corresponding pixel values to the set of candidates. Finally, we
add the pixel values of the endpoints of the arc to the set of candidates.
5.2 Computing Spatial Constraints
While our interval bounds are tight, they can contain spurious images, which cannot be produced by smooth
vector fields of flow γ. To address this, we build upon the idea of Balunovic et al. (2019); Mohapatra et al.
(2020) and introduce linear constraints on the pixel values in terms of the vector field, which can then
be paired with flow-constraints to yield a tighter convex relaxation. We demonstrate how our method can
be applied to tighten the DeepPoly relaxation (Singh et al., 2019b) and robustness certification via mixed
integer linear programming (MILP) (Tjeng et al., 2017).
Upper and lower bounding planes We seek to compute sound linear constraints on the spatially trans-
formed pixel value in terms of the deforming vector field τ . Since every pixel is displaced independently
by its corresponding vector, the linear constraints induce bounding planes of the form
λ0 + λ · τ(i, j) ≤ II((i, j) + τ(i, j)) ≤ υ0 + υ · τ(i, j),
where λT = (λ1, λ2) and υ
T = (υ1, υ2). To compute a sound lower bounding plane, we apply our method
from Section 5.1 to compute the set of candidate coordinates C of potential minima and maxima inB∞δ (i, j)
and then solve
argmin
λ0,λ1,λ2
∑
(p,q)∈C
II(p, q)− (λ0 + λ1(p− i) + λ2(q − j))
II(p, q) ≥ (λ0 + λ1(p− i) + λ2(q − j)), ∀(p, q) ∈ C.
Since both, the objective and the constraints are linear, we can compute this plane in polynomial time using
linear programming. The upper bounding plane is obtained analogously.
Given these linear bounding planes, one could be tempted to simply instantiate the framework from
Balunovic et al. (2019); Mohapatra et al. (2020). Unfortunately, their approach only works in the setting
where multiple pixels are transformed by the same spatial parameters (e.g., rotation angle). However, we
make the key observation that these linear constraints can be leveraged to enforce the flow-constraints, thus
tightening our convex relaxation. We now describe how this can be achieved for the DeepPoly relaxation
and MILP.
Tightening DeepPoly relaxation To compute precise bounds, DeepPoly performs backsubstitution for
each neuron in the network (recall the example in Section 4). That is, every backsubstitution step computes
a linear expression e = a1x1 + . . . + anxn in terms of the input pixels. A naive way to obtain the upper
and lower bounds of e is to substitute the interval bounds for each pixel xi which is equivalent to
min a1x1 + . . .+ anxn
xi ∈ [li, ui].
However, this can be imprecise as intervals do not capture flow-constraints. Thus, we extend the above
linear program with variables v
(i)
x and v
(i)
y denoting the vector field components of every pixel xi, thus
allowing us to add the constraints
λ
(i)
0 + (vx, vy)
(i)λ(i) ≤ xi ≤ υ
(i)
0 + (vx, vy)
(i)υ(i), (5)
−γ ≤ v(i)x − v
(j)
x ≤ γ, and − γ ≤ v
(i)
y − v
(j)
y ≤ γ, (6)
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MNIST CIFAR-10
CONVSMALL PGD CONVSMALL DIFFAI CONVBIG DIFFAI CONVSMALL DIFFAI CONVMED DIFFAI
δ γ DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP
0.3
∞ 51 97 90 91 90 91 40 47 51 56
0.1 78 98 90 92 90 94 45 56 53 60
0.01 91 99 91 95 91 95 50 70 57 70
0.001 92 98 92 95 91 95 53 71 58 73
0.4
∞ 6 89 74 76 78 84 31 38 36 42
0.1 40 91 75 84 78 90 32 46 37 51
0.01 75 98 77 92 78 90 35 67 43 57
0.001 77 99 77 92 78 92 37 69 43 58
0.5
∞ 0 76 40 50 36 62 20 32 29 34
0.1 7 85 44 69 37 79 23 47 30 42
0.01 32 88 44 91 37 89 27 53 31 47
0.001 35 89 44 92 37 90 27 53 33 48
Table 1: T∞-norm certification rates (%) for vector fields τ with displacement magnitude ‖τ‖T∞ = δ and
flow γ.
where λT = (λ
(i)
1 , λ
(i)
2 ) and υ
T = (υ
(i)
1 , υ
(i)
2 ). Here, Equation (5) corresponds to the upper and lower
bounding planes of pixel xi, and Equation (6) enforces the flow-constraints for neighboring pixels i and j.
Minimization of this linear program then directly yields the tightest lower bound on the expression and can
be performed in polynomial time. The upper bounding plane can be obtained analogously.
Tightening MILP certification To encode a neural network as MILP we employ the method from
Tjeng et al. (2017) which is exact for models with ReLU activations. Our approach of leveraging linear
planes on pixel values to enforce flow-constraints can then be directly applied to the resulting MILP by
adding the same variables and linear constraints (Equations (5) and (6)) as in the DeepPoly case.
6 Experiments
We now investigate the precision and scalability of our certification method by evaluating it on a rich
combination of datasets and network architectures. We make our networks and code publicly available
as part of the ERAN framework for neural network verification (https://github.com/eth-sri/eran) to ensure
reproducibility.
Experiment setup We select a random subset of 100 images from the MNIST (LeCun et al., 2010) and
CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) test datasets on which we run all experiments. We consider adversarially
trained variants of the CONVSMALL, CONVMED, and CONVBIG architectures proposed by Mirman et al.
(2018), using PGD (Madry et al., 2018) and DiffAI (Mirman et al., 2018) for adversarial training. Further-
more, for CIFAR-10, we also consider a ResNet with 4 residual blocks with 16, 16, 32, and 64 filters from
Wong et al. (2018). We present the model accuracies and training hyperparameters in Appendix B. We use
a desktop PC with a single GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU and a 16-core Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9900K CPU
@ 3.60GHz, and we report all running times in Appendix C.
Robustness certification We demonstrate the precision of our convex relaxations via robustness certifi-
cation against spatial transformations. To that end, we run DeepPoly andMILP with our interval and spatial
constraints and compute the percentage of certified MNIST and CIFAR-10 images for different networks
and values of δ and γ. Note that γ =∞ corresponds to Section 5.1, and γ <∞ corresponds to Section 5.2.
We limit MILP to 5 minutes and display the results in Table 1 (showing only T∞-norm results for brevity).
We observe that our interval bounds successfully enable certification of vector field attacks and that our
tightened convex relaxation for smooth vector fields offers (at times substantial) improvements across all
datasets, verifiers, and networks. For example, for CONVSMALL PGD on MNIST, DeepPoly certification
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T1-NORM T2-NORM T∞-NORM
δ DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP
0.3 96 97 95 95 90 91
0.5 75 79 70 74 40 50
0.7 23 43 13 33 2 15
0.9 4 21 2 13 1 5
Table 2: Certification rates (%) of CONVSMALL DIFFAI on MNIST for different Tp-norms with γ =∞.
increases from 6% (γ = ∞) to 77% (γ = 0.001) for δ = 0.4. Similarly, for CONVSMALL DIFFAI on
CIFAR-10, MILP certification increases from 38% (γ = ∞) to 69% (γ = 0.001) for δ = 0.4. In fact,
our convex relaxation can also be applied with the k-ReLU verifier (Singh et al., 2019a) where it increases
certification from 24% (γ =∞) to 51% (γ = 0.1) for δ = 0.4 for CONVSMALL PGD on MNIST.
We also compare the certification rates for the different Tp-norms on a CONVSMALL network trained
to be provably robust with DiffAI on MNIST. For brevity, we only consider the case where γ =∞, and we
display the percentage of certified images in Table 2 (with MILP timeout of 5 minutes).
Scaling to larger networks We evaluate the scalability of our convex relaxation by certifying spatial ro-
bustness of a large CIFAR-10 ResNet with 108k neurons trained with the provable defense fromWong et al.
(2018). To account for the large network size, we increase the MILP timeout to 10 minutes. For δ = 0.4,
DeepPoly increases certification from 72% (γ = ∞) to 76% (γ = 0.1), whereas MILP increases certifica-
tion from 87% (γ = ∞) to 89% (γ = 0.1). The average running times per image are 77 seconds (γ = ∞)
and 394 seconds (γ = 0.1) for DeepPoly, and 446 seconds (γ =∞) and 1168 seconds (γ = 0.1) for MILP.
7 Conclusion
We introduced a novel convex relaxation for images obtained from spatial transformations and showed that
this relaxation enables the first certification method for vector field attacks. Our evaluation across different
datasets and architectures demonstrates the practical effectiveness of our methods.
Ethics Statement
It is well known that neural networks can be successfully employed in settings with positive (e.g., person-
alized healthcare) and negative (e.g., autonomous weapons systems) social impacts. Moreover, even for
settings with potentially beneficial impacts, such as personalized healthcare, the concrete implementation
of these model remains challenging, e.g., concerning privacy. In that regard, robustness certification is more
removed from the practical application, as it provides guarantees for a class of models (e.g., image classifi-
cation networks), irrespective of the particular task at hand. For example, our method could be applied to
certify spatial robustness for self-driving cars in the same way that it could be employed to prove robustness
for weaponized drones. Since the spatial transformations considered in our work present a natural way of
describing distortions arising from the fact that cameras map a 3D world to 2D images, our certification
method can be used to comply with regulations or quality assurance criteria for all applications that require
robustness against these types of transformations.
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A Calculation of Candidates
Here, we prove Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, which we employed to efficiently compute the interval bounds li,j
and ui,j such that li,j ≤ II ◦ (I + τ)(i, j) ≤ ui,j , for a pixel (i, j) of an image I and any vector field τ of
Tp-norm of at most δ. To ease notation, we view images as a collection of pixels on a regular grid. In this
case, bilinear interpolation is given by
II (i, j) :=
{
ImnI (i, j) if (i, j) ∈ Amn ,
ImnI (i, j) :=
∑
p∈{m,m+1}
q∈{n,n+1}
I(p, q) (1− |p− i|) (1− |q − j|) ,
where Amn := [m,m+ 1]× [n, n+ 1] is an interpolation region.
Lemma 5.2. The bilinear interpolation ImnI (v, w) on the regionAmn can be rewritten as
ImnI (v, w) = A+Bv + Cw +Dvw. (3)
Proof.
ImnI (v, w) =
∑
p∈{m,m+1}
q∈{n,n+1}
I(p, q) (1− |p− v|) (1− |q − w|)
= I(m,n)(1 +m− v)(1 + n− w)
+ I(m+ 1, n)(v −m)(1 + n− w)
+ I(m,n+ 1)(1 +m− v)(w − n)
+ I(m+ 1, n+ 1)(v −m)(w − n)
= A+Bv + Cw +Dvw,
where the last equality follows from expanding the parentheses and grouping the terms.
Lemma 5.1. The minimum and maximum pixel values of ImnI in B
p
δ (i, j) ∩ Amn are always obtained at
the boundary.
Proof. Let (v, w) ∈ Bpδ (i, j)∩Amn be an interior point such that I
mn
I is extremal at (v, w). Then, assuming
v is fixed, it can be seen from Equation (3) that ImnI is linear in w. Hence, the pixel value is non-decreasing
in one direction and non-increasing in the opposite direction of w, implying that both the minimum and the
maximum are obtained at the boundary.
Hence, for any reachable interpolation region Amn it suffices to consider the boundary of B
p
δ (i, j) ∩
Amn to construct the set of candidates containing the possible minima andmaxima of the pixel inB
p
δ (i, j)∩
Amn. The bounds li,j and ui,j are then the minimum and maximum of the set of candidates, respectively.
B Models
Here, we describe the model accuracies and training hyperparameters. We recall that, for MNIST and
CIFAR-10, we consider defended variants of the CONVSMALL, CONVMED, and CONVBIG architectures
proposed by Mirman et al. (2018), using PGD (Madry et al., 2018) and DiffAI (Mirman et al., 2018) for
adversarial training. Moreover, for CIFAR-10, we also evaluate our certification method on a ResNet with
4 residual blocks with 16, 16, 32, and 64 filters (108k neurons) trained with the provable defense from
Wong et al. (2018).
To differentiate between the training techniques, we append suffixes to the model names: DIFFAI
for DiffAI and PGD for PGD. All DiffAI networks were pre-trained against ℓ∞-noise perturbations by
Mirman et al. (2018) with ǫ = 0.3 on MNIST and ǫ = 8/255 on CIFAR-10. For CONVSMALL PGD
we used 20 epochs of PGD training against vector field attacks with δ = 0.5, using cyclic learning rate
scheduling from 1e−8 to 1e−2, and ℓ1-norm weight decay with trade-off parameter 1e−3. We provide the
model accuracies on the respective test sets in Table 3.
15
DATASET MODEL ACCURACY TRAINING
MNIST
CONVSMALL PGD 97.53% SPATIAL PGD
CONVSMALL DIFFAI 94.52% DIFFAI
CONVBIG DIFFAI 97.03% DIFFAI
CIFAR-10
CONVSMALL DIFFAI 42.60% DIFFAI
CONVMED DIFFAI 43.57% DIFFAI
RESNET 27.70% WONG ET AL. (2018)
Table 3: Model test accuracies and training parameters.
MNIST CIFAR-10
CONVSMALL PGD CONVSMALL DIFFAI CONVBIG DIFFAI CONVSMALL DIFFAI CONVMED DIFFAI
δ γ DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP
0.3
∞ 1.0 28.0 0.1 1.7 18.5 269.6 0.6 45.8 0.4 89.9
0.1 8.1 54.8 7.2 11.2 65.4 240.1 109.8 353.3 83.3 338.9
0.01 10.7 59.6 7.1 12.7 68.6 288.9 160.5 372.0 116.8 351.1
0.001 12.2 97.0 7.2 33.4 86.4 327.9 201.0 415.0 173.2 469.5
0.4
∞ 0.8 48.6 0.1 1.7 19.8 275.5 0.2 59.1 0.6 153.4
0.1 9.4 71.3 3.1 15.9 65.1 261.6 94.7 363.3 86.2 333.9
0.01 11.9 61.6 3.1 8.4 77.1 319.8 104.9 268.8 107.0 368.3
0.001 12.0 43.0 3.1 11.0 73.3 314.2 92.6 293.7 104.7 379.5
0.5
∞ 0.8 97.3 0.1 1.9 25.7 252.6 0.5 128.8 0.7 214.6
0.1 9.8 76.6 7.2 34.6 62.3 225.5 103.0 320.7 93.8 353.3
0.01 11.2 87.0 7.3 19.5 72.4 231.6 159.9 404.1 109.4 373.7
0.001 85.6 12.1 7.1 28.6 65.9 288.1 139.8 370.1 125.3 410.4
Table 4: Average running times (seconds) for certification of vector fields τ with displacement magnitude
‖τ‖T∞ = δ and flow γ.
C Running Times
Here, we provide the running times averaged over our random subsets of 100 test images. As mentioned
in Section 6, we run all experiments on a desktop PC with a single GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPU and a
16-core Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9900K CPU @ 3.60GHz.
In Table 4 we display the average certification times corresponding to the experiment from Table 1
in Section 6. Likewise, we display the running times corresponding to the Tp-norm comparison experiment
from Table 2 in Table 5. We recall that every instance of the MILP is limited to 5 minutes.
The average running times for the k-ReLU verifier (Singh et al., 2019a) using our convex relaxation
with k = 15, an LP-timeout of 5 seconds, and a MILP-timeout of 10 seconds are: 176.4s (γ = ∞) and
285.3s (γ = 0.1) for δ = 0.4.
T1-NORM T2-NORM T∞-NORM
δ DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP DEEPPOLY MILP
0.3 0.1 1.4 3.8 5.2 0.1 1.7
0.5 0.1 1.5 4.1 6.4 0.1 1.9
0.7 0.1 2.4 2.6 3.6 0.1 4.0
0.9 0.1 5.6 4.3 11.5 0.1 40.8
Table 5: Average running times (in seconds) for certification of CONVSMALL DIFFAI on MNIST for
different Tp-norms with γ =∞.
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original γ = ∞ γ = 0.1 γ = 0.01 γ = 0.001
δ
=
0
.3
(a) label 8 (b) label 8 (c) label 8 (certified) (d) label 8 (certified)
δ
=
0
.4
(e) label 5 (adversar-
ial)
(f) label 4 (g) label 4 (certified) (h) label 4 (certified)
δ
=
0
.5
(i) label 5 (adversar-
ial)
(j) label 9 (adversar-
ial)
(k) label 3 (certified) (l) label 3 (certified)
δ
=
0
.6
(m) label 4 (adversar-
ial)
(n) label 0 (certified) (o) label 0 (certified) (p) label 0 (certified)
δ
=
0
.7
(q) label 6 (certified) (r) label 6 (certified) (s) label 6 (certified) (t) label 6 (certified)
Figure 4: Image instances and corresponding deforming vector fields τ with displacement magnitude
‖τ‖T∞ = δ and flow γ.
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D Visual Investigation
In this section, we compare original and deformed MNIST images for different T∞-norm values δ and
flow-constraints γ. To that end, we employ the CONVSMALL DIFFAI network together with our convex
relaxation with MILP to evaluate whether the deformed images are adversarial or certified (or neither) and
we display the images in Figure 4. Note that since both MILP and our interval bounds are exact for single-
channel images, the fact that Figure 4a is not adversarial is due to failure of the attack, as an adversarial
vector field with δ = 0.3 and γ = ∞ must exist (else MILP would certify this image). On the other
hand, for Figure 4b we cannot say whether the attacker fails to find an adversarial image or if our convex
relaxation is not precise enough to certify the image (since we are using an over-approximation to enforce
the flow-constraints).
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